20 ideas
| 4869 | Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza] |
| 21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
| 21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
| 21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
| 21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
| 21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
| 22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |